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Advocacy Coalitions, Beliefs and Climate Change Policy in 
the United States 
 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) asserts that disagreement over policy 
core beliefs divides organizations into competing coalitions. We apply Discourse 
Network Analysis to 1410 statements in Wall Street Journal, New York Times and 
USA Today, to investigate what kinds of beliefs contribute to coalition formation in 
the climate policy debate in the United States. We find that the beliefs concerning the 
reality of anthropogenic climate change, the importance of ecology over economy 
and desirability of governmental regulation divide organizations into three coalitions: 
the economy, ecology and science coalitions. Policy preferences such as cap and 
trade do not; they find support across coalition lines. Based on these findings, we 
suggest ACF theory could be clarified to better account for how beliefs concerning 
policy instruments contribute to coalition formation. In some policy domains, policy 
instruments are where opposing coalitions find agreement. In others, they are more 
divisive. 
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network analysis; Advocacy Coalition Framework 
 
Introduction 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier 1988; Sabatier & 
Jenkins-Smith 1993) is one of the most prominent theoretical frameworks for 
examining the features of policy process and change. The ACF asserts that 
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organizations group into competing advocacy coalitions on the basis of shared policy 
beliefs and that the coalitions have a crucial role in influencing policy outcomes. The 
ACF’s strength comes from its broad view of politics as it focuses on the 
relationships between various organizations who aim to influence the normative 
orientations and outcomes of a specific policy subsystem (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 
1999; Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014).  
According to the ACF, the most important factor tying advocacy 
coalitions together is shared policy core beliefs (Sabatier & Weible 1993; Sabatier 
1998, p. 103). Policy core beliefs are generally defined as including “basic 
orientation and value priorities for the policy systems, or whose welfare in the policy 
system is of utmost concern”, as well as “assessments of the seriousness of the 
problem, its basic causes and the preferred solutions for addressing it” (Jenkins-
Smith et al. 2014, p. 191). Policy core beliefs are contrasted with deep core beliefs 
that are too general to form as a basis for coalition formation, and with secondary 
beliefs, that are too specific to play this role. However, assessing three decades of 
scholarship on the ACF, the creators of the framework have identified considerable 
"variation in conceptualizations and measurement of belief systems", and called for 
an "effort to clarify the theoretical distinction between policy core and secondary 
aspects" (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014, p. 196). 
In this paper, we heed this call through empirically analyzing coalition 
formation in the media debate on climate change in the United States. We separately 
test the influence of different types of beliefs on coalition formation. We find that the 
empirical and normative beliefs, such as those concerning the validity of climate 
science and prioritization of ecological over economic objectives do contribute to 
coalition formation, while beliefs concerning policy instruments, such as cap and 
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trade, do not. Comparing these results with those of earlier studies, we suggest ACF 
theory could be refined to better account for the role of beliefs concerning policy 
instruments in coalition formation. In some policy domains and moments in time, 
such as the one studied here, policy instruments are where opposing coalitions find 
agreement. In others, they are more divisive. 
Our main contribution, thus, is theoretical: clarifying the role of 
different types of beliefs in coalition formation. For this reason, our data is from an 
exceptional time period in the history of US climate change policymaking. We 
analyze the years 2007-2008, during which climate change was a more salient issue 
in the US public debate than ever before or after: climate change legislation was 
making progress in an unprecedented way at the federal and state levels (Knox-
Hayes 2012). This time period, during which old disagreements dividing coalitions 
remained but some consensus was also forming, provides the best data for our task, 
which is to investigate what kind of beliefs divide organizations into opposing 
coalitions and what kinds find support across coalition lines. Our intention, therefore, 
is not to provide an overall picture of the climate change debate in the US, nor to 
analyze coalition formation in this policy domain more generally – both of these 
tasks have already been taken up in earlier studies (e.g. Fisher et al. 2012; Knox-
Hayes 2012; Dunlap & McCright 2015; Farrell 2015). Our results should be read 
with this in mind. 
The overall picture of US climate politics painted by earlier studies is 
one of policy stagnation.  No government has been able to pass federal climate laws, 
and the task has been delegated to subnational efforts instead (Rabe 2009). Studies 
have particularly underlined the strategies of the climate change counter movement 
which includes influential organizations with links to the fossil fuel industry. These 
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organizations have actively mobilized in various forums to advocate scientific 
uncertainty and economic threat scenarios in order to shape public perceptions of 
climate change (McCright & Dunlap 2003, 2000; Pooley 2010; Oreskes & Conway 
2010; Greenberg et al. 2011, Hoffman 2011; Farrell 2016, 2015; Boussalis & Coan 
2016). The counter movement’s strategies seem to be working. Public opinion on 
climate change has become increasingly polarized along ideological lines (McCright 
& Dunlap 2011; Brulle et al. 2012), and a majority of Americans still cast doubt on 
anthropogenic global warming (Leiserowitz et al. 2015). 
Around the years 2007-8 however, the positions presented at 
congressional hearings on climate change became more consensual across partisan 
lines, especially concerning the policy instrument of cap and trade (Fisher et al. 
2013). This increase in consensus almost resulted in policy change when the 
American Clean Air and Security Act aimed at establishing a federal cap and trade 
policy, went all the way through the House of Representatives before hitting a wall 
in the Senate (Rabe 2010). Since then, the counter-movement has regrouped and 
polarization of beliefs concerning climate change has continued (Dunlap & McCright 
2015). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: first, we present 
the current state of the theoretical debate on the role of beliefs in coalition formation 
in the ACF and our research questions. Second, we present our newspaper data and 
the method of Discourse Network Analysis. Third, we show that the policy 
subsystem - as presented in the media - is divided in three coalitions, the Economy 
Coalition, the Ecology Coalition and the Science Coalition, based on their diverging 
policy core beliefs, and look at the composition of the coalitions and their arguments. 
Fourth, we show that beliefs concerning specific policy instruments such as cap and 
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trade do not contribute to the formation of opposing coalitions; rather, there is quite a 
widespread consensus on these instruments. Finally, we discuss the implications of 
our findings to the empirical literature on climate change policymaking in the US 
and to the conceptualization of the belief system in the ACF theory. We will also 
address the limitations of our study, related to the use of media material in 
identifying coalitions. 
Theoretical Framework and Research Questions 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework posits that organizations group 
into coalitions based on shared beliefs. Some kinds of beliefs, however, are more 
critical than others in binding coalitions together. Jenkins-Smith et al. (2014, p. 185) 
describe a belief system as a hierarchical, “three-tiered structure”. Deep core beliefs 
are fundamental ontological beliefs which may extend to multiple policy subsystems. 
Policy core beliefs, in turn, are specific to the policy subsystem. Normative policy 
core beliefs range from ideas about whose welfare counts the most to value priorities. 
Empirical policy core beliefs concern the causes and severity of a policy problem 
and its solutions (ibid. 191). Secondary beliefs deal with smaller subsets, described 
as “instrumental means for achieving the desired outcomes in the policy core beliefs” 
(Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014, p. 191). They include narrower beliefs, concerning, for 
example, issues in locales and budgets. 
Empirical studies support the idea that the middle level of the 
hierarchical belief system, the policy core beliefs, is what plays the most crucial role 
in structuring interactions between organizations into coordination networks 
(Sabatier & Weible 2005; Leifeld 2013; Ingold 2014). The hierarchy of beliefs 
implies that beliefs differ in their susceptibility to change (Jenkins-Smith et al. 
2014): whereas deep core beliefs are very resistant to change, the policy core is held 
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less rigidly, and secondary aspects are even more readily altered in light of new 
information. Policy actors are expected to be more willing to compromise in 
secondary aspects than to yield in policy core issues and to dismiss deep core debates 
(Sabatier & Weible 2007; Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014). 
Since the definition of policy core beliefs is wide, ACF scholars have 
measured coalitions with different types of beliefs. This has led to inconsistency and 
problems in theory accumulation about the role of different types of beliefs in policy 
making. For example, Sabatier and Weible (2005) measure coalitions using four 
policy core beliefs, ranging from the problem definition to specific policy 
instruments, in their survey on marine protected areas in California. Some studies, 
however, have shown that coalitions may be formed around specific policy 
preferences alone (e.g. Leifeld 2013). Yet others have independently measured the 
influence of normative policy core beliefs and specific policy instruments on 
coalition formation, finding that both do have an effect (Ingold 2011). Ingold did, 
however, use the term ‘secondary beliefs’ when referring to policy instruments in her 
study on Swiss climate policy. Overall, the creators of the ACF have recently 
assessed that theorizing the belief system remains “analytically underdeveloped and 
inconsistent in empirical research” (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014, p. 196), and called for 
clarification, especially concerning the relationship between policy core and 
secondary beliefs. 
The latest developments in the debate concerning the belief system in 
the ACF have focused on the relationship between the two top levels, deep core 
beliefs and policy core beliefs. Important advances in this respect have been made by 
Sotirov and Winkel (2016) and Jenkins-Smith et al. (2014), both broadening the 
conceptualization of the belief system in the ACF with insights from Cultural Theory 
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(Douglas 1966; Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). Sotirov and Winkel suggest that 
shared or complementary core beliefs are key in enabling strategic cross-coalition 
alliances, while Jenkins-Smith et al. argue that understanding deep core beliefs in 
terms of Cultural Theory holds “considerable promise for enhancing the conceptual 
coherence and explanatory reach of belief systems within the ACF” (Jenkins-Smith 
et al. 2014, p. 485). At the same time, the equally important problem of the 
relationship between the two bottom levels, policy core beliefs and secondary 
aspects, has been identified in the literature (e.g. Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014, p. 196–
197) but we are not aware of systematic attempts at solving it. 
In this paper, we focus on the role of policy core beliefs, such as those 
concerning the reality of anthropogenic climate change on the one hand, and beliefs 
concerning policy instruments such as cap and trade on the other as the “glue that 
holds a coalition together” (Sabatier 1998, p. 105). We investigate whether both 
types of beliefs play an equal role in coalition formation, or whether some of these 
beliefs do not have an effect and should thus be classified as secondary. Our 
empirical case is the climate change policy domain in the United States. Following 
earlier studies (Leifeld 2013; Lodge and Matus 2014), we use media material to 
investigate coalitions and their beliefs. 
The climate policy domain has been highly conflictual for decades, 
which indicates that organizations’ fundamental beliefs are against each other. 
Organizations involved include political parties, universities, government agencies, 
environmental organizations, and conservative Christian groups; climate change has 
become a highly salient issue that everyone seems to have something to say on. The 
case is thus likely to provide a wide range of beliefs and potential coalitions to 
analyze. 
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Our main research questions are the following:  
RQ1: Can we discern competing advocacy coalitions based on 
normative and empirical beliefs, such as those concerning the reality of 
anthropogenic climate change and prioritization of ecological over 
economic objectives? 
RQ2: Can we discern competing advocacy coalitions based on specific 
policy preferences such as cap and trade? 
Method and Material 
Scholars have used a wide variety of research material, including 
interviews and surveys (Weible & Sabatier 2005; Ingold 2011; Elgin & Weible 2013; 
Author B, 2016), public policy documents (Jenkins-Smith et al. 1991; Heikkila et al. 
2014) and, increasingly, media material (Leifeld 2013; Lodge and Matus 2014) to 
investigate the beliefs uniting advocacy coalitions. Our material is drawn from the 
mass media. Thus, our study has the same limitation as most ACF studies using text 
material such as policy documents or media material: we measure beliefs but not 
coordination of action among coalition members. The coalitions we identify, then, 
are best understood as discourse coalitions, i.e. groups of organizations that voice 
similar beliefs in the media debate. They may or may not work together to turn these 
beliefs into policy outside the media sphere, but our data does not allow for 
analyzing the extent to which such coordination takes place. Recent empirical 
evidence, though, supports the ACF assumption that belief homophily is a good 
predictor of inter-organizational collaboration (Matti & Sandström 2011; 2013). 
Some other types of research material such as surveys are superior in the sense that 
they can measure both beliefs and coordination of action (e.g. Author B, 2016; Elgin 
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& Weible 2013), but they have other limitations, such as missing data due to low 
response rates. 
 We use the newly developed method of Discourse Network Analysis 
(DNA) (Leifeld 2010, 2013; Leifeld & Haunss 2012; Fisher et al. 2012, 2013; 
Stoddart & Tindall 2015). DNA combines social network and discourse analysis to 
create relational data by linking actors into networks, based on agreement or 
disagreement over policy beliefs. DNA, then, allows us to examine one of the most 
important features in policymaking, according to the ACF: ‘the ideational structure 
of policy domains’ (Leifeld & Haunss 2012, p. 402).  
Our research material consists of articles from three newspapers: The 
Wall Street Journal, USA Today and the New York Times. These are the three US 
newspapers with the largest circulation, and as such, can be expected to have 
significant impact on public opinion and policy elites. They also represent the 
political spectrum from (moderate) right to (moderate) left, enabling us to avoid 
ideological bias associated with any single news outlet. The WSJ represents 
conservative/right-leaning ideology, the NYT liberal/left-leaning ideology and USA 
Today centrist ideology (Gentzkow & Shapiro 2010).  
We examine the period 2007-08, for two reasons. First, it was a period 
during which media attention to global warming was just reaching its peak globally 
and in the US (Schmidt et al. 2013). Some drivers of the increased attention were Al 
Gore’s movie An Inconvenient Truth (2006), the Stern Review on the economics of 
climate change (2006), IPCC’s 4th assessment report (2007) and increased 
congressional activity around climate change legislation from 2007 onwards (Fisher 
et al. 2013). 
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Second, and more importantly, this time period provides the best 
material for addressing our theoretical problem. Because we are interested in the 
differences between the kinds of policy beliefs that divide organizations into 
coalitions and those that do not, we pick a period during which some temporary 
elements of consensus are emerging in a field that has, before as well as after our 
sample period, been deeply divided (Knox-Hayes 2012; McCright, Xiao & Dunlap 
2014). In other words because the primary aim of this paper is to make a theoretical 
contribution to the ACF literature, rather than providing a comprehensive view of the 
climate change debate in the US, we have chosen our research material with this aim 
in mind. We will address the consequences of this choice below when discussing our 
results in relation to earlier findings about climate change politics in the US. 
We searched Factiva using the search terms “global warming” and 
“climate change,” and, after a manual check, chose only articles that dealt primarily 
with climate change. Of these articles, we selected a 20% random sample, resulting 
in total of 648 articles to be comprehensively coded. This dataset was then 
transferred in MS Word format into the Discourse Network Analyzer (DNA) 
software to code statements and organizations. DNA uses a statement as the unit of 
analysis. A statement is coded whenever an organization makes a claim about 
climate change that can be interpreted as a policy core belief, following the definition 
of ACF. Four attributes are coded for each statement: 
First, the person making the statement is coded.  
Second, the organization making the statement is coded. 
Third, a belief category, is assigned to the statement.  
Finally, a dummy variable indicating the organization’s agreement or 
disagreement with the belief category is coded. 
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We coded both direct quotes from organizations and statements that 
were paraphrased by the journalist. An example statement reads: 
“Mr. Obama, the Democratic presidential candidate from Illinois, 
called for imposing a national cap for carbon emissions…’No business 
will be allowed to emit any greenhouse gases for free’, Mr.Obama 
said in Portsmouth, N.H., ‘Businesses don’t own the sky, the public 
does, and if we want them to stop polluting it, we have to put a 
prize on all pollution.’” October 9, 2007. The New York Times. 
 
This statement is coded as follows: (1) Barack Obama, 2) Democratic Party, (3) the 
belief category “cap and trade is the legislative approach the US should take in 
addressing climate change”, (4) and is in agreement with this belief category. 
We formed the belief categories inductively, in an iterative process. We 
extracted a total of 1410 statements from 332 different organizations, which were 
coded into seventeen belief categories. For the purposes of our research questions, 
and in order to meaningfully analyze competing coalitions based on beliefs using 
network methods, we chose the six largest, most frequently appearing belief 
categories. Together, they represented 63% of all the statements. Table A1 in the 
Appendix lists all 17 belief categories. Of these six, three are more general normative 
and empirical policy core beliefs while the other three are beliefs concerning specific 
policy preferences. The three general beliefs are (1) the empirical belief concerning 
the reality of climate change and validity of climate science, expressed in the 
statement “the scientific claims that anthropogenic greenhouse gases contribute to 
climate change are valid”; (2) the normative belief that ecological objectives should 
be prioritized over economic ones, expressed in the statement “regulating GHG 
emissions to protect the environment is more important than protecting the 
economy”; and (3) the normative belief that governmental regulation is desirable, 
expressed in the statement “industry should be regulated in the US to decrease GHG 
emissions that contribute to climate change.” The three beliefs concerning specific 
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policy instruments we coded are (1) “cap and trade is the legislative approach the US 
should take in addressing climate change,” (2) “higher auto efficiency standards are 
necessary in the US to reduce GHG emissions, which cause climate change” and (3) 
“increasing alternative energy production (wind, solar, hydro, geo, wave) is the 
approach the US should take in addressing climate change.” 
The final coding was then exported to Gephi software for social 
network analysis in order to create visual representations of the DNA data and to test 
for the existence of competing, belief-based advocacy coalitions with community 
detection methods. This was done by constructing co-occurrence networks of 
organizations via the belief categories, where a relationship is established between 
organizations if they both occur in the same belief category and both agree or both 
disagree with the belief. For example, a link between two organizations is established 
if they both state that climate science is valid, or if they both state that cap and trade 
is not a good policy instrument.  A co-occurrence matrix is an undirected, weighted 
network, the edges of which reflect the strength of discursive association (Leifeld & 
Haunss 2012). In the network, nodes represent the actors while edges represent 
shared agreement or shared disagreement on a belief category. 
To detect the coalitions around shared policy beliefs, co-occurrence 
networks were analysed using the Louvain method, which measures how well a 
network decomposes into modular communities. The algorithm optimizes 
modularity, a value between -1 and 1, which measures the density of links inside 
communities compared to links between communities If the value is larger than 0.4, 
the differences between communities are usually considered meaningful (Blondel et 
al. 2008). In the case of weighted networks, such as the ones we analysed, 
modularity is defined as: 
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where Aij represents the weight of the edge between i and j, ki=∑jAij is the sum of the 
weights of the edges attached to node i, ci is the community to which the node i is 
assigned, the δ function δ(u, v) is 1 if u = v   and 0 otherwise and m=&'∑ ijAij  (Blondel 
et al. 2008, 2–3). 
Results 1: Three Competing Coalitions Based on General Empirical 
and Normative Beliefs 
The answer to our first research question, “can we discern competing 
advocacy coalitions based on empirical and normative beliefs”, is a clear yes: we 
find (1) a Pro-Economy and Counter-Science Coalition (henceforth the Economy 
Coalition for short), (2) an Ecology Coalition, and (3) a Science Coalition. Figure 1 
shows that the discourse network is divided into three fairly distinct coalitions with 
many intra-coalition ties and fewer ties to other coalitions. The modularity value 
returned by the Louvain model, 0.474, easily reaches the threshold of 0.4, usually 
considered a criterion of meaningful coalitions (Blondel et al. 2008), confirming the 
visual observations that can be made from Figure 1. The node sizes represent the 
degree centrality of each organization, i.e. the number of ties that a node has. 
A link between two organizations represents them taking the same position on an 
issue, i.e. both either agreeing or disagreeing on one of the following beliefs: (1) 
science validly shows that climate change is anthropogenic, (2), ecology is more 
important than economy and (3) governmental regulation of industry to curb climate 
change is desirable. 
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FIGURE 1 Actor congruence network based on empirical and 
normative policy core beliefs 
 
Table 1 below shows the positions of each coalition on these issues, 
demonstrating that they are highly consistent in expressing their beliefs. The 
Economy Coalition makes 97% of the statements denying the validity of climate 
science, 91% of the statements prioritizing the economy over the environment and 
90% of the statements opposing industry regulation. The Ecology Coalition makes 
98% of the statements in favor of industry regulation, 72% of the statements 
prioritizing the environment over the economy and 38% of the statements arguing for 
the validity of climate science. The Science Coalition makes 52% of the claims 
defending climate science and 16% of the claims prioritizing the environment over 
the economy. 
 
TABLE 1 Share of statements by coalitions (%)  
 
The following three subsections look at the composition of each 
coalition and the content of their public statements to provide more in-depth 
evidence for the existence of coalitions. The Appendix presents the descriptive 
statistics showing the composition of each coalition by organization type. 
The Economy Coalition 
The most visible individual actor in the Economy Coalition is the 
Republican Party. Others include the Bush Administration, fossil fuel companies, 
groups from the conservative movement (e.g. Heartland Institute, Cato Institute), 
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business lobbies (e.g. the Competitive Enterprise Institute, American Petroleum 
Institute) and trade associations from energy, manufacturing and agricultural sectors. 
The coalition is glued together by beliefs that relate to freedom of economy and its 
precedence over the environment. Members of this coalition often emphasize the 
uncertainty of climate science: 
‘For me, climate change is a human issue, not just an 
environmental one… The science of global warming is speculative. But 
there’s nothing speculative about the damage a carbon dioxide capture 
program will do this country. I know the names of many of the thousands of 
people – American workers, their families – whose lives will be destroyed by 
what has become a deceitful and hysterical campaign, perpetrated by fear-
mongers in our society and by corporate executives’ intent on their own 
profits or their competitive advantage. I can’t stand by and watch.’  (James 
Murray, CEO of Murray Energy, the Wall Street Journal, May 19, 2007) 
 
However, only a few actors from the field of business attacked against 
climate science: instead, more often the conservative Christian groups, think tanks 
and the Republican Party saw IPCC-led climate science and related legislation as 
ideologically motivated and political rather than as a scientific project. Policy 
recommendations based on climate science were perceived to threaten the 
fundamental components of American culture, such as the nuclear family, religion, 
patriotism, and the freedom of the individual and economy. 
Earlier research on the role of the climate change counter-movement 
(e.g. Farrell 2016) in undermining the need for climate policies would lead one to 
expect that the Economy Coalition would be dominant in the media debate. 
Somewhat contrary to this expectation, we find that while the economy coalition is,
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indeed the largest one of the three when measured in terms of the number of 
organizations belonging to it (44), the other two coalitions, the Ecology Coalition 
and the Science Coalition together easily outnumber it (64 organizations). Measured 
by the number of statements, the Economy Coalition is not dominant either: it makes 
145 of the statements, while the other two coalitions combined make a total of 152. 
During the period analyzed here, then, the Economy coalition is strong but not 
clearly dominant in the mainstream media sphere. 
The Ecology Coalition 
Key organizations in the Ecology Coalition are international ones such 
as the IPCC and the EU and, on the national level, states. This finding marks a 
difference between our approach that uses media material and most studies using the 
ACF, that tend to look at national actors only. In the media, and especially in debates 
that concern issues of global political and scientific relevance, international actors 
can, thus, be an important part of the coalition structure.  
  Environmental NGOs, the Democratic Party and some corporations 
are also part of this coalition. These organizations expressed the belief that the 
environment should be the number one priority in climate policy despite its possible 
economic costs and that protecting the environment does not have to exclude 
economic growth. In Kansas, the secretary of the Department of Health and 
Environment attempted to block the building of a coal-fired plant, a potentially big 
financial boost to the state, despite the opposition that came even from his own staff: 
“It would have been irresponsible to ignore emerging information about the 
contribution of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases to climate change 
and the potential harm for our environment and health if we do nothing.” 
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(Roderick L. Bremby, secretary of the Kansas Department of Health and 
Environment, the Wall Street Journal, March 19, 2008) 
 
Indeed, states were visible in putting pressure on the federal 
government to reduce emissions by regulating industry. For example, 10 eastern 
states initiated the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in 2007, the goal of which 
was significant reductions in power plant emissions, while on the West Coast, 
California was a proponent of industrial regulation.  
A business coalition called BICEP (Business for Innovative Climate 
and Energy Policy), which includes some of the largest consumer product companies 
(such as Nike, Starbucks and Levi Strauss), called for stronger climate policies to 
create a green economy because they claim the economy will be hurt by the warming 
climate (USA Today, Nov. 20, 2008.) Thus, in the media sphere, there is a division 
within the corporate sector between those, (mainly fossil fuel) corporations that 
oppose any climate change legislation and those (mainly consumer product) 
corporations who see it as desirable. The extent to which the latter kind of 
corporations actually engage in concerted action beyond the media sphere with 
actors such as environmental organizations is, of course, a question that our media 
data does not permit us to answer. 
The Science Coalition 
The Science Coalition mainly consists of national and international 
universities. Members of the coalition believe that “Global warming is unequivocal 
and that human activity is the main driver, ‘very likely’ causing most of the rise in 
temperatures since 1950,” as the IPCC (2007, p. 72) states. Many experts spoke of 
the significance of the IPCC 4th assessment report:  
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“Since 2001, there has been a torrent of new scientific evidence on the 
magnitude, human origins and growing impacts of the climatic changes that 
are under way…in overwhelming proportions, this evidence has been in the 
direction of showing faster change, more danger and greater confidence about 
the dominant role of fossil-fuel burning and tropical deforestation in causing 
the changes that are being observed.” (John P. Holdren, president of the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science, the New York Times, 
Feb. 3, 2007) 
These organizations perceive the policy problem of climate change as a 
scientific one, not taking stands on value priorities. Their statements often 
emphasized the negative environmental impacts: rising mean temperatures and sea 
levels, warming of lands and oceans, and extreme weather events. A few 
corporations and the UN also spoke for climate science. 
Results 2: No Competing Coalitions Based on Specific Policy 
Instruments  
Our second research question asked whether we can discern competing 
coalitions built around specific policy instruments. Figure 2 shows a relatively 
unsegmented discourse network. This visual observation is confirmed by the 
modularity value returned by the Louvain method, 0.265, which is well below the 
threshold of 0.4 and much lower than the figure produced by our analysis on 
normative policy core beliefs above (0.474). We tested several values for the 
resolution of the Louvain model, but the modularity values remained persistently 
low, and thus, all iterations failed to detect coalitions in the network. 
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FIGURE 2 Actor congruence network based on specific policy 
instruments. 
 
A look at the number of organizations defending and opposing each of 
the three policy instruments and a qualitative analysis of the debate substantiates this 
argument. Table 2 shows that the majority of organizations agree on these 
instruments, despite the centrality of organizations that are usually opposed to 
ambitious climate policy, such as the Republican Party and industry organizations. 
Cap and trade is supported by 80%, higher auto efficiency standards by 73% and 
increasing use of renewable energy by 89% of participants in the debate. 
 
TABLE 2 The three most prevalent policy instruments in the debate and the share of 
organizations agreeing and disagreeing with them (%) 
 
Our qualitative analysis focuses mainly on cap and trade, the most 
debated issue in our material. The cap and trade debate was particularly prominent 
due to the Waxman-Markey bill, which sought to set up a mandatory cap-and-trade 
system for greenhouse gases. In the media, the bill was endorsed by most 
organizations, even corporations from energy, manufacturing and financial sectors, 
who stated it would further encourage firms to switch to alternative energies. During 
this period, many businesses saw some kind of regulation as inevitable, and thought 
of cap and trade as a lesser evil than carbon taxes. They thus attempted to influence 
the design of the cap and trade bill. A CEO of an energy company stated: 
“We’ve got to find common ground among the stakeholders – consumers, 
industry, regulators, policy makers and environmental groups…they can’t all 
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be satisfied but there has to be some common ground so each of them can buy 
in.” (Jim Rogers of Duke Energy Corp., New York Times, March 7, 2007) 
 
In January, 2007, ten companies from the electricity industry, including 
the coal mining industry, formed an informal coalition with leading environmental 
groups to push the federal government to reduce emissions by 10 to 30% in the next 
15 years. Some of these business executives even testified before a Senate 
subcommittee on energy, recommending clean technology and federal caps as the 
best solutions to global warming. Some environmental organizations, in turn, 
denounced the fossil fuel companies’ benevolence as calculating. Indeed, Duke 
Energy Corp. was at the time one of the biggest producers of carbon dioxide 
emissions in the US and was in the process of demanding permits for new coal plants 
(New York Times, March 7, 2007). 
Many in the Republican Party as well argued for cap and trade and 
alternative energy: 
“National security depends on energy security … the profit motive [in cap 
 and trade] will attract the transformational power of venture capital and 
 unleash the market to move to clean alternative fuels and advanced  
 energy technologies from the margins into the mainstream”. (Senator  
 John McCain, Republican Party, New York Times, April 23, 2007) 
 
Like cap and trade, also alternative energies and setting auto efficiency 
standards found support across organizations. However, a minority of actors, such as 
the Bush Administration, individual members from the Republican and Democrat 
parties, business lobby and trade associations raised arguments opposing cap and 
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trade, claiming that it would be economically disastrous and would result in the loss 
of jobs and of US national competitiveness. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
In this final section, we discuss the implications of our results to (1) the 
empirical literature on climate change policy in the US, and (2) the theory of the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework and the role of beliefs concerning policy preferences 
in it. 
We found that disagreement over the general normative and empirical 
beliefs concerning the reality of anthropogenic climate change, the importance of 
ecology over economy and desirability of governmental regulation divide actors into 
three coalitions: the Economy Coalition, the Ecology Coalition and the Science 
Coalition. Specific policy instruments (cap and trade, auto efficiency standards and 
support for renewable energy) do not. Instead, the instruments find broad support 
across coalition lines and organization types. 
These findings help in understanding the seemingly divergent results of 
earlier studies on US climate change politics, most finding increasing polarization 
but others finding elements of consensus. The overall story told in the literature is 
one of polarization and policy stagnation. The polarization is mainly over general 
policy core beliefs concerning the validity of climate science and the anthropogenic 
nature of climate change (McCright and Dunlap, 2011). Elements of consensus, 
however, were emerging at the high point of the media debate and legislative action 
on climate change in 2007-2008, both in the congress, as shown by Fisher et al. 
(2013) and the media, as shown here. The emerging consensus concerned mainly 
specific policy instruments, particularly cap and trade, while polarization remained 
over general policy core beliefs (cf. Fisher et al. 2012). As Pooley (2010) has shown, 
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cap and trade legislation was indeed very close to passing in 2009 because it was 
moderate enough and able to win widespread support. 
Since then, support for cap and trade has waned and polarization has 
increased. The climate change counter movement has regrouped and become 
stronger in opposing national climate legislation (Pooley 2010; Dunlap & Jacques 
2013; McCright, Xiao & Dunlap 2014; Dunlap and McCright 2015). Studies have 
affirmed the influence of The Tea Party and its related groups, supported by the 
Koch brothers, who contribute to the increasing liberal-conservative divide by 
endorsing anti-environmental and anti-regulatory beliefs among political elites and 
the public (e.g. Mayer 2016; Skocpol & Hertel-Fernandez 2016; Bohr 2016). 
Overall then, our results obtained using media material are consistent 
with other studies looking at congressional hearings and public opinion polls, 
suggesting that the media, the congress and the polls are interlinked and combining 
the results of studies on all three gives a relatively accurate picture of the reality of 
US climate change politics and its changes over time. 
The only significant divergence between our results and earlier 
applications of ACF in US climate change politics (e.g. Weible 2005; Heikkila et al. 
2014) is that in our analysis based on media the environment and science coalitions 
appear as separate, while in studies using other material environmental groups and 
scientists often belong to the same advocacy coalition. It seems that in the media, 
there is a division of labor between scientific organizations advocating for climate 
science and environmentalists calling for policy action. The economy coalition, 
however, is a unified coalition: the same organizations are involved in countering 
both climate science and ecological/pro-regulatory beliefs. 
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Our results must be read with the limitations of our data and method in 
mind. First, because our theoretical interest lies in the possibilities of building 
consensus across coalition lines, we chose data from a period where some consensus 
was developing in an otherwise contentious policy domain. Our empirical results, 
therefore, cover that period only, and should be complemented by further studies 
looking at the evolution of media discourse networks over time. Second, any study 
using media material is vulnerable to the possibility that there may be systematic bias 
in the kind of claims that journalists choose to report. Studies comparing positions 
taken by organizations in their documents or research interviews versus the ones that 
are reported in the media could be designed to investigate this type of bias. Third, 
there is a possibility that organizations strategically present positions in the media 
that are not consistent with their actions elsewhere; for a business firm and an 
environmental organization to take the same position on a particular policy 
instrument in the media debate does not mean that they consistently agree on 
environmental policy. Indeed, as our empirical analysis showed, environmental 
organizations often denounce pro-environment talk by businesses in the media 
as “greenwash”. But we also found reports documenting coordinated action and joint 
statements by ENGO-business alliances. Fourth, we only measure beliefs, not 
coordination of action between coalition members. Research designs comparing 
media discourse networks with survey or interview data that includes information 
on collaboration would provide insight into how discourse networks reflect actual 
policy networks in terms of coordination and political influence. Such comparison 
would also help better grasp the dynamics of US climate policy making since not all 
organizations that are relevant in the policy subsystem necessarily appear in the 
media, for strategic reasons or as result of editorial decisions.  
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Moreover, the key assumption of the ACF that shared beliefs are the 
most important factor influencing coalition formation has been questioned by some 
scholars. Resource dependency theory (RDT), for example, argues that 
organizational resources such as perceived influence are the strongest determinant of 
collaboration relationships (e.g. Stokman and Berveling 1998). However, testing 
RDT against ACF, Matti and Sandström (2011; 2013) find that beliefs do matter 
more than resources, as predicted by the ACF. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume 
that the coalitions we find in this paper do also involve at least some degree of 
interorganizational collaboration.  
Comparing our results on US climate politics with those of earlier 
studies on other policy domains, we propose the following clarification to the 
definition of the belief system in the ACF: Beliefs concerning the desirability and 
feasibility of specific policy instruments cannot be a priori classified as either policy 
core beliefs (beliefs that divide actors into coalitions) or secondary beliefs (beliefs 
that are less divisive). Rather, the role of beliefs concerning policy instruments in 
coalition formation varies between policy domains and periods of time. In the case 
studied here, policy instruments such as cap and trade find support across coalition 
lines and thus, are classified as secondary beliefs. In other policy domains, such as 
German pension policy studied by Leifeld (2013) and Swiss climate change policy 
studied by Ingold (2011), beliefs concerning policy instruments do divide 
organizations into coalitions and thus, ought to be classified as policy core beliefs. 
Our proposal is in line with early formulations of the ACF (e.g. Sabatier 1998), but 
as we showed above, the empirical literature is rather inconsistent in this respect, 
which has led to calls for conceptual clarification (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014). 
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An important task for future research, then, would be to try and specify 
the conditions under which beliefs concerning policy instruments are divisive, and 
the conditions under which they find support across coalition lines. Identifying these 
conditions would be helpful for understanding policy gridlocks and possibilities for 
policy change. A first step towards this direction is taken by Leifeld (2013, p. 193), 
who suggests that beliefs concerning policy instruments glue coalitions together 
especially in redistributive subsystems where the normal state of policy making is the 
dominance of one hegemonic coalition, in comparison to regulative ones where the 
normal state is often more competitive, including two to three competing coalitions. 
Comparative studies across policy domains and countries are needed to assess 
the generalizability of this suggestion, and to identify other possible conditions under 
which policy instruments divide policy actors or serve as devices for consensus 
building.  
The ACF theorizes that policy change may occur through situations of 
‘negotiated agreement’ when ‘previously warring coalitions’ need to stop a ‘hurting 
stale mate’ (Sabatier & Weible 2007; Jenkins Smith et. al 2014). Our results suggest 
that the role of specific policy preferences, being more alterable than the more 
general beliefs, may be crucial during this type of policy process. The situation 
where consensus emerges over policy instruments while polarization remains over 
general policy core beliefs may, in fact, be relatively common. This is likely to apply 
especially to situations where there is a policy instrument on the table that gives 
something, so to speak, to both of the opposing coalitions, especially in highly 
conflictual, regulative subsystems. Cap and trade is an example of such an 
instrument. It gives environmentalists some form of legislation with potential to 
reduce emissions, and businesses are happy to see it done using a market mechanism, 
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something that they tend to believe in more than, say, carbon taxes or outright 
government regulation of emissions. The specific solution speaks to the general 
policy core beliefs of both of the opposing coalitions and thus, has potential to act as 
a consensus-building device. This, we argue, is a possible explanation of the recent 
worldwide emergence of cap-and-trade systems instead of carbon taxes, even though 
the latter would likely be clearly more effective in reducing emissions (Avi-Yonah & 
Uhlmann 2009; Wittneben 2009). Due to the single-case nature of our study and the 
limitations of our data, we offer these reflections not as a firm theoretical conclusion 
but rather, as a proposition to be examined in further studies. Work testing which 
kinds of policy instruments tend to gain support across coalition lines in different 
policy domains and polities could constitute a significant theoretical advance in the 
ACF. 
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Appendix 
TABLE A.1. Belief Categories in the US Media Debate on Climate Policy During 
2007-08. 
 
Issue category 
% 
Disagree 
% 
Agree 
% of all 
categories 
Cap & Trade is the legislative approach the US should take 
in addressing climate change. 
20 % 80 % 23 % 
Higher auto efficiency standards are necessary in the US to 
reduce GHG emissions that cause climate change. 
27 % 73 % 13 % 
The scientific claims that anthropogenic greenhouse gases 
contribute to climate change is valid. 
42 % 58 % 9 % 
Regulating GHG emissions to protect the environment is 
more important than protecting the economy. 
63 % 37 % 7 % 
Industry should be regulated in the US to decrease GHG 
emissions that contribute to climate change. 
37 % 63 % 6 % 
Increasing alternative energy production (wind, solar, 
hydro, geo, wave) is the approach the US should use in 
addressing climate change. 
11 % 89 % 5 % 
States should be able to have stricter GHG emissions laws 
than the federal government. 
25 % 75 % 5 % 
The US should not wait for other major emitters to decrease 
GHG emissions before reducing its own. 
52 % 48 % 5 % 
Technological solutions like carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) are an appropriate way to mitigate climate change 
9 % 91 % 4 % 
Increasing biofuel production is an approach the US should 
take in addressing climate change. 
33 % 67 % 4 % 
Increasing nuclear power generation is the approach the US 
should take in addressing climate change. 
14 % 86 % 3 % 
Climate change legislation is needed to address climate 
change in the US. 
11 % 89 % 3 % 
A carbon tax is the legislative approach the US should take 
in addressing climate change. 
25 % 75 % 3 % 
Voluntary emission reductions are useful in helping the US 
reduce GHG emissions. 
24 % 76 % 3 % 
Higher efficiency standards are needed in all sectors of the 
economy to reduce GHG emissions. 
0 % 100 % 2 % 
Increasing hybrid/electric car production is the approach the 
US should take in addressing climate change. 
14 % 86 % 1 % 
Climate change has led to many severe weather events and 
related phenomena. 
25 % 75 % 1 % 
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The Endangered Species Act (ESA) should be used as a way 
to regulate GHGs and protect arctic species from the 
impacts of climate change 
55 % 45 % 1 % 
Grand Total 28 % 72 % 100 % 
 
 
TABLE A.2. Organizations in the Economy Coalition, share of statements by 
organization type (N=145, %) 
 
Republican Party  18 
Foreign Government  16 
Bush Administration  15 
Business Lobby/Trade Associations  11 
Energy Companies (fossil fuels)  13 
National Government  6 
Conservative Groups  5 
Democratic Party  4 
Academic  3 
Other   9 
Total   100 
 
 
TABLE A.3. The Ecology Coalition, share of statements by actor type, (N=86, %) 
    
States 20   
Foreign Government 15   
ENGO's 14   
Democratic Party 10   
National Government 10   
Business 7   
Energy Companies (fossil fuels) 5   
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Academic/Research 5   
Other 14   
Total 100   
 
 
TABLE A.4. The Climate Science Coalition, share of statements by actor type, 
(N=66, %) 
Academic/Research 68    
United Nations  6    
Business  6    
ENGO's  4    
Political Parties 4    
Foreign Government 3    
Other  9    
Total  100    
 
 
